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CORPORATE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION AND 
THE INTERPRETATION OF CONGRESSIONAL 
INTENT:  WHERE WILL IT END? 
Patrick J. McNulty* and Adam D. Zenor** 
And now, We wish to speak to rulers of nations ... We beg of you, never 
allow the morals of your peoples to be undermined ... [D]o not tolerate any 
legislation which would introduce into the family those [artificial 
contraceptive practices] which are opposed to the natural law of God. 
Humanae Vitae—Encyclical Letter of Pope 
Paul VI on the Regulation of Birth—1968 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the waning days of the United States Supreme Court’s term last 
summer, the longstanding clash between the United States Government and 
forces aligned with the natural law of God concerning the contraception 
mandate of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 
culminated in a victory for religious liberty by for-profit closely held 
corporations;2 gave rise to the issuance of an extraordinary reprieve excusing 
non-profit religious organizations from complying with an opt-out 
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1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 26, 29, 30, and 42 U.S.C.).  The contraception mandate requires 
employer healthcare plans to provide coverage for specified services to women as part of a 
comprehensive and no-cost preventive care and screening program.  42 U.S.C § 300 gg–13(a)(4) 
(2010).  Congress delegated the task of establishing these guidelines and specifications to the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).  Id.  In consultation with the Institute of Medicine, 
HRSA recommended coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity. 
Women’s Preventative Services Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. HEALTH 
RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited May 1, 2015).  The 
Department of Health and Human Services formally adopted these recommendations and also 
provided the HRSA the authority to exempt group health plans maintained by certain religious 
employers.  See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issues Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,626 
(proposed Aug. 1, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147.130). 
2. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768, 2785 (2014). 
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notification provision of the mandate;3 and sparked cries of bewilderment 
and betrayal by the dissenting justices in each of the two cases.4  In the first 
decision, the Court divined an intent of Congress—dating back to the 1993 
passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)5 —to bestow 
upon for-profit corporations the right to exercise religion.6  The legislative 
rulers of our nation, the Court declared in the consolidated cases of Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.7 and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. 
Burwell,8 granted for-profit corporations relief from government-imposed 
substantial burdens on religiously motivated business practices if a less 
restrictive means of achieving the compelling governmental objective 
exists.9  Applied to the contraception mandate, the Court held that if human 
shareholders of for-profits sincerely believe the natural law of God forbids 
the use of certain female contraceptive drugs and devices, then their 
companies are excused from adhering to the earthly obligation to subsidize 
insurance coverage for such services unless the government can show there 
is no other way to achieve the goals of the mandate.10  The government could 
not make such a showing, the Court concluded, because it already had 
established an accommodative process for non-profit religious 
organizations.11 
The religious empowerment of for-profits hinges on the change in 
definition of “exercise of religion” in the 2000 amendment to RFRA.12  In 
1993, Congress defined “exercise of religion” to mean “the exercise of 
religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution.”13  In 2000, 
Congress tweaked the terminology to “religious exercise” and changed the 
definition to “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or 
                                                                                                                           
3. See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014) (order granting emergency application 
for injunction pending appellate review). 
4. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2808 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
5. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb4 (2012)), invalidated as to states and subdivisions by City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
6. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69. 
7. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 2759. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 2759–60. 
12. See id. at 2761 (noting the most relevant part of RFRA for purpose of analyzing the scope of free 
exercise protection is contained in the 2000 amendment).  This amendment was enacted as part of 
another statute.  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), Pub. 
L.No. 106-274, § 7(a)(3), 114 Stat. 803, 806. 
13. RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 5(4), 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993). 
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central to, a system of belief.”14  A revolutionary change?  Apparently.15  A 
change in which Congress broke free from the gravitational and narrow orbit 
of First Amendment jurisprudence the Court itself had recently imposed?16 
Absolutely, according to the five-justice majority, which announced the 2000 
definitional change amounted to nothing less than a “complete separation 
from First Amendment case law.”17  RFRA now rules the world of religious 
liberty in situations in which the federal government attempts to substantially 
burden the exercise thereof.18  The Free Exercise Clause has been rendered 
moot on governing the validity of federal action, the result of a Congressional 
coup d’état brought on by the Court’s own failed stewardship.19  The Court 
suffered this reversal of power gracefully—at least in the area presented by 
the facts of these consolidated cases—sexual morality and contraceptive 
use.20  
Justice Ginsburg dissented.21  Joined by three of her colleagues, she saw 
RFRA as restorative of a prior line of Supreme Court cases, not as a bold 
initiative by Congress to expand protection for a class of commercial entities 
whose owners could impose their religious beliefs on others.22  A minefield 
of litigation surrounding the scope of religious excuses would ensue, she 
feared.23  
Three days later, on July 3, 2014, the Court enjoined the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) from enforcing a regulation that a non-
profit religious organization, otherwise exempt from providing contraceptive 
care under HHS rules, must certify its religious objections on a government-
issued form and send a copy of the completed form to the third-party 
                                                                                                                           
14. See RLUIPA §§ 7(a)(3), 8(7)(A), 114 Stat at 806.(the definition is contained in section 8(7)(A) and 
is incorporated into section 7, the section containing the 2000 amendments to RFRA). 
15. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (recognizing that Congress, by enacting RFRA, went far 
beyond what the Court held is constitutionally required). 
16. See id. at 2761 (recognizing Congress enacted RFRA in response to Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), a decision in which the 
Court had repudiated its twenty-seven-year-old balancing test Congress was now restoring).  
17. Id. at 2762. 
18. See id. at 2785 (acknowledging there is no need to reach the constitutional free exercise claim, a 
claim which is judged by a more rigorous standard).  In fact, the majority did not comment on the 
dissent’s point that the First Amendment indisputably would not provide any relief to the claims of 
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga.  Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
19. See RFRA, Pub. Law. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993) (amended 2000) (finding the 
unalienable and constitutional right of free exercise needed to be protected by restoring the 
compelling-interest balancing test the Supreme Court had virtually eliminated in Smith). 
20. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760, 2785 (recognizing that RFRA largely repudiated its prior 
method of analyzing free-exercise claims, and that the wisdom of RFRA is not the Court’s concern, 
only its interpretation, as written). 
21. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
22. Id. at 2791–92. 
23. Id. at 2805–06. 
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administrator of its health insurance plan.24  All Wheaton College had to do, 
pending appellate disposition of its contention that sending the form to its 
third-party administrator made it complicit in the evil of delivery of 
emergency contraceptives, was notify HHS in writing that it was a non-profit 
that had religious objections to providing contraceptive coverage.25  
Although HHS was aware of the identity of Wheaton College’s third-party 
administrator, it is unclear how HHS is supposed to contact health care 
coverage representatives of exempt organizations in other cases given the 
limited notice required by the Court.26  Justice Sotomayor dissented, 
believing along with the other two female justices, that the Court had 
retreated from its assurances made three days previous that the joinder of for-
profits in the same accommodative status as religious non-profits, would 
have no impact on the ability of women from obtaining what Congress had 
mandated—no-cost preventive contraceptive care.27  The Court is guilty of 
misleading the country, she exhorted.28 
There we have it—two decisions in three days with one unmistakable 
message: Religiously based, anti-contraceptive beliefs held by either non-
profit religious organizational employers or shareholders of for-profit closely 
held corporations are entitled to wide latitude in determining whether no-cost 
contraceptive insurance coverage furthers the public-health interests of the 
country.  HHS responded quickly to these judicial developments, 
promulgating a set of interim final regulations on August 27, 2014.29  In 
addition to recognizing the rights of for-profit, closely held corporations to 
lodge religious objections to the contraception mandate,30 the department 
proposed an alternate method of notice for the self-certification 
requirement.31  Now a conscientious religious objector has the option of 
notifying HHS of its objections, along with the name and contact information 
of its health plan representative, so that HHS can, in the words of the Court 
in Wheaton College, “facilitate the provisions of full contraceptive 
coverage”32 to employees and dependents.33   
                                                                                                                           
24. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014) (order granting emergency application for 
injunction pending appellate review). 
25. Id. at 2807. 
26. Id. at 2815 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
27. Id. at 2808. 
28. See id. (stating Americans could not take the Court at its word, and that the Court’s action evinces 
disregard for even the newest of precedent and undermines confidence in the Court). 
29. Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,092, 
51,101 (proposed Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 147.131(c)(1), (c)(2)(i)). 
30. Id. at 51,094. 
31. Id. at 51,101. 
32. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807. 
33. See Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
51,101. 
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Not surprisingly, this alternate means of notification did not placate all 
litigants, some of whom successfully argued that submitting a notice of 
exemption makes them accomplices in the sinful act of contraception, and 
thus, substantially burdens their free-exercise rights under RFRA, justifying 
the entry of a preliminary injunction against HHS from enforcing the 
mandate.34  The end game for these twenty-first century conscientious 
objectors, the authors submit, is the judicial establishment of a religious 
principle akin to the 1968 papal decree that any legislative sanctioning of the 
use of contraceptives cannot be tolerated.35  This is outrageous.  ACA 
proponents prevailed in the halls of Congress.  Must the victors now conform 
their conduct to the religious necessities of human shareholders of 
corporations that are in the business of making money, not tending to souls? 
This Article examines why RFRA was enacted and amended; the 
questionable rationale employed by the Court to invent a for-profit free-
exercise right; why the plain language of RFRA and constitutional tradition 
command a different result; and why the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment is the last refuge against religiously based, anti-contraceptive 
beliefs becoming the official position of the United States Government.  
We begin with the story of the religious plight of two unemployed 
peyote smokers in Oregon in the mid-1980s.  Their tale of woe is the first 
link in the causal chain of how the natural law of God, embodied in the anti-
contraceptive beliefs of profit-seeking human shareholders, emerged as a 
papal-like beacon shining through the morass of immoral legislation.  
II.   SACRAMENTAL PEYOTE AND THE ENSUING LEGISLATIVE / 
JUDICIAL TUSSLE 
Peyote usage was a felony in Oregon in the 1980’s.36  Alfred Smith and 
Galen Black, Oregon residents and members of a Native American Church, 
ingested peyote for sacramental purposes during a religious ceremony at their 
church.37  When their employer found out, they were fired.38  They applied 
for unemployment compensation benefits but initially were denied on the 
                                                                                                                           
34. Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, No. 5:14-cv-00685-R, 2014 WL 7399195, at *4, *7 (W.D. 
Ok. Dec. 29, 2014); Insight for Living Ministers v. Burwell, No. 4:14-cv-675, 2014 WL 6706921, 
at *2-3, *5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2014); Ave Maria School of Law v. Burwell, No. 2:13-cv-795-JSM-
CM, 2014 WL 5471054, at *1, *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2014).  One court has rejected this argument.  
School of the Ozarks, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., No. 13-03157-cv-5-BP, slip 
op. at 6-9 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 13, 2015). 
35. Pope Paul VI, Humane Vitae: Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Paul VI on Regulation of Birth, 
Vatican (July 25, 1968), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/ 
 documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html. 
36. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
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basis of felonious misconduct.39  The state administrative denial eventually 
reached the United States Supreme Court, and the Court faced the question 
whether the First Amendment free-exercise rights of Smith and Black had 
been violated.40  In its 1990 decision, the Court answered no,41 and in the 
process, fundamentally changed the constitutional prism of how claims of 
governmental interference with religious freedom are to be viewed.  No more 
ascertaining whether the governmental action is a substantial burden on 
sincere religious exercise; no more fear of stepping into the abyss of 
evaluating the importance and centrality of religious doctrine; and no more 
scrutinizing whether a compelling governmental interest, if any, outweighs a 
claim of free exercise.42  In its place, a new constitutional viewfinder took 
focus, one based on the legitimacy of the purpose and scope of the 
governmental action.43  The Court held that as long as the law at issue is 
neutral and generally applicable, the right of free exercise does not excuse 
compliance.44  
Congress was not happy, and indeed, its members were nearly united in 
their reaction.  By a unanimous vote in the House of Representatives and 
with only three dissenters in the Senate, it enacted RFRA in 1993.45 
Returning to the days of yesteryear, at least those years between 1963 and 
1990, Congress cast aside the neutral and general applicability standard, 
restored the compelling interest test, and added or ratified (depending on your 
perspective) a requirement that any substantial burden on a person’s exercise 
of religion be accomplished by the least restrictive means available.46 
Congress did not define “person” or “person’s,” and its definition of 
“exercise of religion”—“the exercise of religion under the First Amendment 
to the Constitution”47—did not break new ground.  In other words, Congress 
had no problem with the Court’s past decisions on the scope of protected 
exercise; it just wanted to resurrect a test which had struck a sensible balance 
                                                                                                                           
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 875–76. 
41. Id. at 890. 
42. Id. at 885–89. 
43. Id. at 879. 
44. Id. 
45. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
46. RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §§ 2–3, 107 Stat. 1488-89 (1993) (amended 2000).  In her dissenting 
opinion in Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the confusion on whether the least 
restrictive alternative element was part of the judicial strict scrutiny analysis prior to Smith.  See 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2793 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 509 (1997) (RFRA’s “least restrictive means requirement was not used in the pre-Smith 
jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify”) (Syllabus of Court), with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 407 (1963) (“[I]t would plainly be incumbent upon the [government] to demonstrate that no 
alternative forms of regulation would combat [the problem] without infringing First Amendment 
rights.”).  
47. RFRA, § 5(4), 107 Stat. at 1489 (prior to 2000 amendment). 
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between the traditional exercise of religious liberty and competing 
governmental interests.48  
As noted previously, however, Congress modified the definition of 
“exercise of religion” in 2000.49  The path to this legislative adjustment is a 
bit serpentine.  In 1997 the Supreme Court declared that Congress had 
exceeded its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
imposing RFRA’s requirements on the states.50  The decision arose from a 
refusal by local zoning authorities to issue a building permit to the 
Archbishop of San Antonio to enlarge a church located in a historic district 
and the Archbishop’s subsequent RFRA challenge.51  Meanwhile, several 
federal appellate courts required RFRA plaintiffs (all prisoners) to show their 
religious exercise occupied a “central” role in their religion.52  In response to 
both of these developments, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).53  State and local land use 
regulation and state and local correctional oversight became subject to the 
compelling interest/least restrictive alternative test if an affected person’s 
religious exercise was substantially burdened.54  And in a specific directive 
to the courts that it wanted to ensure maximum constitutional protection,55 
Congress defined religious exercise to include “any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of belief.”56  Amending 
RFRA as part of the enactment of RLUIPA, Congress incorporated the new 
definition of “religious exercise”57 and also removed the reference to state 
and local applicability.58  “Religious exercise” as defined in the two statutes 
was now identical, and RFRA was expressly limited to actions of the federal 
government.  This was the extent of the 2000 amendments to RFRA, a 
clarification or touching up, if you will, brought on by these separate 
developments.  
Fast forward ten years to the regulatory rollout of the ACA.59  Pursuant 
to a Congressional directive that certain employer-sponsored group health 
                                                                                                                           
48. Id. § 2, 107 Stat. at 1488. 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 12–17. 
50. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
51. Id. at 511–12. 
52. Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 819–20 (8th Cir. 1997); Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65 F.3d 
489, 490-91 (6th Cir. 1995); Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1478, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995); 
Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 948–49 (9th Cir. 1995). 
53. RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–cc5 (2000)). 
54. Id. §§ 2-3, 114 Stat. at 803–04. 
55. Id. § 5(g), 114 Stat. at 806. 
56. Id. § 8(7)(A), 114 Stat. at 807. 
57. Id. § 7, 114 Stat. at 806. 
58. Id. § 7(b), 114 Stat. at 806. 
59. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 26, 29, 30, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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plans cover preventive care and screenings at no cost for women,60 the Health 
Resources and Service Administration (HRSA), in consultation with the 
Institute of Medicine at the National Academy of Science, developed a set of 
comprehensive guidelines.61  With respect to contraceptive services, HRSA 
recommended that group health plans cover “[a]ll Food and Drug 
Administration [FDA] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with 
reproductive capacity.”62  FDA-approved contraceptive methods include oral 
contraceptives, barrier methods, implants and injections, emergency oral 
contraceptives, and intrauterine devices.63  HHS accepted the 
recommendations and also proposed a religious employer exemption.64 
Essentially covering only those in ministerial positions, the proposed 
exemption was limited to those religious employers whose purpose was the 
inculcation of religious values, who primarily employed and served people 
of their own faith, and who were non-profit organizations within the meaning 
of the Internal Revenue Code.65  
Contentious does not begin to capture the ensuing public debate over 
the scope of this religious exemption.  Academics, religious leaders, health 
care professionals, and John Q. Public weighed in loudly and sometimes not 
so clearly;66 Catholic and other Christian employers expressed moral outrage, 
arguing the mandate forces them to violate religious doctrine;67 and dozens 
of lawsuits were filed seeking injunctive relief.68  HHS expanded the breadth 
                                                                                                                           
60. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010). 
61. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMN., supra note 1.   
62. Id.  Other types of female preventive service for which health care coverage was recommended 
include: well-women visits, screening for gestational diabetes, human papillomavirus testing, 
counseling for sexually transmitted infections, counseling and screening for human-immune-
deficiency virus, breastfeeding support, supplies, and counseling, and screening and counseling for 
interpersonal and domestic violence.  Id. 
63. Birth Control: Medicine to Help You, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/ 
forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.htm (last updated Jan. 8, 2015). 
64. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issues Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46626 (proposed Aug. 1, 
2011). 
65. Id. 
66. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemption from the 
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 343, 348 n.17 (2014) (collecting examples of heated religious liberty rhetoric).  The 
government reports receiving over 400,000 comments to its proposed regulations.  Coverage of 
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,092, 51,094 (Aug. 27, 
2014). 
67. Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 66, at 344–45. 
68. HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.org/ hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
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of the religious exemption,69 but the lawsuits kept coming.70  The 
administrative parade of notice, comment, and revision came to an end on 
August 1, 2013, with the adoption of the final set of regulations delineating 
the scope of the religious employer exemption.71  The HHS determined that 
churches and religious orders were exempt.72  Other religious employers, 
denominated “eligible organizations,” can claim an exemption if they are an 
organization 1) which holds itself out and operates as a non-profit entity and 
as a religious organization; 2) opposes providing coverage for some or all of 
the mandated contraceptive services on account of religious objections; and 
3) is willing to certify that it is an organization which meets the preceding 
criteria.73  
Secular, for-profit corporations obviously did not meet the criteria. 
Closely held, faith-based family corporations, in particular, objected, joining 
the cavalcade of litigation arguing that because their shareholders believe that 
human life begins at conception, because it is immoral to facilitate any act in 
contravention of that belief, and because they are dedicated to the operation 
of their corporations consistent with their faith, their free-exercise rights 
under RFRA and the First Amendment are being substantially burdened.74  
In the summer of 2013 the Third and Tenth Circuits reached conflicting 
results on the RFRA free-exercise claims of two of these for-profit 
corporations.  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a family owned multi-million dollar 
corporation with 13,000 employees prevailed in the Tenth Circuit;75 
                                                                                                                           
69. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8474–
75 (proposed Feb. 6, 2013). 
70. See HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note 68 (itemizing by date when relief was granted 
or denied in the injunctive suits challenging the mandate). 
71. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 
39,896-97 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131). 
72. See id. at 39,896 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a)).  The language of the regulation actually 
speaks of nonprofit entities organized and operated as such and referred to in sections 
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) and (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
73. See id. at 39,896 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)(1-4)). 
74. Gilardi v. Sebelius, 926 F. Supp. 2d 273, 274–76 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014); Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399, 402–03 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d sub nom., 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724 F.3d 
377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *1-3 (W.D. Mich. 
Dec. 24, 2012), aff’d, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case 
remanded sub nom., Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014); Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Serv., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738–39 (S.D. Ill. 2012), rev’d, 735 F.3d 654 (7th 
Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284–85 (W.D. Okla. 
2012), rev’d en banc, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
75. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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Conestoga Wood Specialties, Corporation, a much smaller family operation 
out of Pennsylvania, was not successful.76  By the time the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari,77 three more circuits had issued decisions on corporate free 
exercise.78  A bit of background on all five cases is in order. 
III.  HARVESTING CORPORATE PROFITS WITH A CONSCIENCE  
The Mennonite Church, a Christian denomination, believes “[t]he fetus 
in its earliest stages . . . shares humanity with those who conceived it.”79 
Norman and Elizabeth Hahn and their three sons are devout Mennonites.80 
They are the only shareholders of a family wood-working business, 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation, which is organized under 
Pennsylvania law as a for-profit corporation.81  It employs 950 persons.82  
The Hahns believe they are required to operate the company’s business and 
endeavor to make a reasonable profit “in accordance with their religious 
beliefs and moral principles.”83  In addition, the Hahns, in their capacity as 
directors of the corporation, adopted a resolution titled “Statement on the 
Sanctity of Human Life” in which they profess their belief that human life 
begins at conception, and that it is sinful to be involved in the termination of 
human life after conception.84  Of the twenty FDA-approved birth control 
methods,85 the Hahns believe that four of them, two forms of “morning after” 
pills and two types of intrauterine devices, may operate after fertilization of 
                                                                                                                           
76. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724 F.3d 
377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub. nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014). 
77. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 
(2013), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 
2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), rev’d sub. nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. 
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
78. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 
733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 
2902 (2014); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated, and case remanded sub nom., Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014). 
79. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764 (quoting Statement on Abortion, MENNONITE CHURCH USA (July 
2003), http://resources.mennoniteusa.org/resource-center/resources/statements-and-resolutions/ 
statement-on-abortion/). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id.  
83. Id. (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (E.D. Pa. 
2013), aff’d sub nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and 
Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
84. Id. at 2764–65. 
85. Id. at 2766.  The approved methods are found at FDA, supra note 63.  
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an egg occurs.86  Conestoga opposed the ACA requirement to provide 
coverage for these four so-called abortifacients because the payment or 
facilitation of the use of these drugs and devices would result in the Hahns 
engaging in immoral and sinful conduct.87  Accordingly, Conestoga excluded 
from its group-health-insurance plan these four contraceptive methods and 
sought, along with the Hahns, an injunction against requiring their inclusion 
in the plan.88  The district court denied a preliminary injunction, and a divided 
Third Circuit affirmed, holding that for-profit secular corporations cannot 
engage in religious exercise within the meaning of RFRA or the First 
Amendment.89  The Third Circuit also rejected the claim brought by the 
Hahns themselves because the HHS mandate did not impose any requirement 
on them personally.90  
The four alleged abortifacients were also the focus of injunctive actions 
brought by two Oklahoma for-profit corporations and their shareholders 
against HHS in federal court in Oklahoma.91  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and 
Mardel, Inc. are businesses collectively owned by David and Barbara Green 
and their children.92  Hobby Lobby is an arts and crafts chain with over 500 
stores and about 13,000 full-time employees.93  Mardel operates thirty-five 
Christian bookstores and employs close to 400 people.94  Like the Hahns, the 
Greens believe that life begins at conception, and it would violate their 
religion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after 
that point.95  Each family member signed a pledge to run the businesses in 
accordance with the family’s religious beliefs.96  Based on those beliefs, both 
corporations and all five Greens challenged the legality of the contraceptive 
mandate.97  The district court denied a preliminary injunction but the Tenth 
Circuit, sitting en banc reversed, finding the companies are “persons” within 
the meaning of RFRA, that they had demonstrated irreparable harm, and that 
they had established a likelihood of success on their RFRA claims.98  The 
                                                                                                                           
86. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id.  
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 2766. 
92. Id. at 2765.  The Greens operate the businesses through a management trust, of which each family 
member is a trustee.  Id. n.15. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 2766. 
96. Id.  The family also provided that the management trust would be governed according to the family 
members’ religious principles.  Id. at 2765 n.15. 
97. Id. at 2766. 
98. Id. 
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case was remanded for the district court to consider the remaining factors of 
the preliminary injunction test.99  
Before the Court granted the petitions for writ of certiorari in Conestoga 
and Hobby Lobby on November 26, 2013,100 the Sixth, Seventh, and District 
of Columbia Circuits similarly weighed in on the rights of for-profit 
corporations to challenge the legality of the contraceptive mandate under 
RFRA.101  All of the cases involve closely held corporations which are owned 
and controlled by family members, all of whom are Roman Catholics and 
believe, consistent with the church’s doctrines that all forms of artificial 
contraception, not just the four so-called abortifacients, are against the 
natural law of God.102  And like the Hahns and Greens, these Catholic family 
members believe that offering contraceptive drugs and devices as part of an 
employer-sponsored health plan is sinful as it makes them complicit in the 
morally wrongful act of another.103  
 The Sixth Circuit sided with the Third Circuit’s approach in Conestoga, 
rejecting the general claim that the family corporation is a person under 
RFRA as well as the more specific argument that the shareholders’ free-
exercise rights pass through to the corporate shell such that the corporation 
is the real party in interest to assert their individual rights.104  In addition, and 
consistent with the result in Conestoga, the family members’ claims were 
dismissed based on the shareholder standing rule, namely, that shareholders 
cannot bring claims intended to redress injuries incurred by the 
corporation.105  The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, tracked the reasoning of the 
Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby, holding that a corporation is a “person” within 
the meaning of RFRA.106  The District of Columbia Circuit took a different 
                                                                                                                           
99. Id. 
100. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 
(2013), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir.), 
cert. granted, sub nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), rev’d 
sub. nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
101. Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 
and case remanded sub nom., Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014); Korte v. Sebelius, 
735 F.3d 654, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d 
1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment reversed, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902 
(2014). 
102. Autocam Corp, 730 F.3d at 620–21, cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded sub nom., 
Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014); Korte, 735 F.3d at 659, 662–64; Gilardi, 733 
F.3d at 1210, cert. granted, judgment reversed, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014). 
103. Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 621; Korte, 735 F.3d at 659, 662–64; Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1218. 
104. Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 624–28. 
105. Id. at 623. Another panel of the Sixth Circuit followed the result in Autocam five weeks later.  Eden 
Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 631–32 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and 
remanded sub nom., Eden Foods, Inc. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014). 
106. Korte, 735 F.3d at 682. 
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path, holding that while a corporation is not a person under RFRA, the 
shareholders have standing to assert claims on their own behalf as they have 
been injured in a way that is separate and distinct from the harm incurred by 
the corporation, an injury which gets around the shareholder standing rule.107  
Five circuit court decisions, fourteen opinions among those five 
decisions,108 and three different approaches form the prelude to the ultimate 
resolution of the conflict between all forms of artificial contraception,109 as 
mandated by the ACA, and a person’s religious objections thereto under 
RFRA.  We turn now to the Court’s decision in Conestoga and Hobby Lobby 
of June 30, 2014.  
IV.  THE CANONIZATION OF CORPORATE AND HUMAN 
SHAREHOLDER FREE EXERCISE 
A.  The Dogmatic View of Five 
The question presented for writ of certiorari in both cases was identical: 
“Whether RFRA allows a for-profit corporation to deny its employees the 
heath coverage of contraceptives to which the employees are otherwise 
entitled by federal law, based on the religious objections of the corporation’s 
owners.”110  The Court recast the issue stating it was charged with deciding 
whether RFRA permits an agency of the United States Government to 
demand that closely held for-profit corporations pay for female contraceptive 
health care coverage for their employees and their dependents in violation of 
the shareholders’ religious beliefs.111  By a 5-4 vote, the Court held HHS 
could not lawfully make such a demand because its regulations impose a 
                                                                                                                           
107. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1215-16. 
108. The Tenth Circuit led the charge with six opinions.  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 
1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014).  Each panel member in Gilardi wrote an opinion, while the Conestoga and Korte cases 
each produced two opinions.  Gilardi, 733 F.3d 1208; Contestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y 
of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom., 
Conestoga Woods Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Korte, 735 F.3d 654.. 
Finally, Autocam was unanimous.  Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded sub nom., Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 
2901 (2014). 
109. Counsel for Hobby Lobby and Conestoga conceded at oral argument that his RFRA-based argument 
encompasses objections to all forms of artificial contraception.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–
39, Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354, 13-356). 
110. Brief for the Petitioner at (I), Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2951 (2014) (No. 13-354); Brief for Petitioner at (I), 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, rev’d sub nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. 
v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-356). 
111. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2757. 
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substantial and impermissible burden on the free exercise of religion.112 
According to the majority, the protection provided in RFRA for a “person’s 
exercise of religion” clearly encompasses free-exercise rights of for-profit 
corporations and the religious liberty of their human shareholders.113  In fact, 
the majority declared, it is simply not possible to read the statute any other 
way.114  Three major reasons were offered to support this unequivocal 
interpretation.  The first two relate to the meaning of “person;” the third, to 
the scope of exercise of religion. 
As RFRA does not define the term “person,” it is necessary, the Court 
reasoned, to consult the Dictionary Act to determine its meaning.115  Under 
the Dictionary Act, the word “person” includes corporations, companies, and 
the like as well as individuals, unless the context indicates otherwise.116  The 
context of RFRA does not indicate otherwise, the Court held, because viable 
RFRA claims by non-profit corporations previously had been entertained, a 
fact the government conceded.117  No conceivable definition of “person” 
could include individuals and non-profit corporations but exclude for-profit 
corporations, because giving the same word a different meaning for each 
corporate category would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one.118  
Second, corporations are fictionalized conduits for which the rights of 
their human shareholders are formalized and protected.119  In the Court’s 
words: “[w]hen rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to 
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of [the people associated 
with the corporations].”120  Once lodged within the corporate shell and passed 
through to human owners, the religious rights of these shareholders can then 
be asserted by the corporation.121  In other words, a for-profit corporate 
employer, an entity which must abide by the contraceptive mandate, has 
standing to invoke the “passed-through” religious beliefs of its human 
                                                                                                                           
112. It is impermissible because the governmental action does not constitute the least restrictive means 
of serving a compelling government interest.  The government could have accommodated the free 
exercise rights of these corporations and shareholders much like it did eligible religious 
organizations by excluding contraceptive care from the group plan but allowing such care to be 
separately paid for by the insurer.  Id. at 2782. 
113. Id. at 2768. 
114. See id. at 2772 (dismissing the argument that the statute’s protection of the exercise of religion was 
limited to those religious practices previously recognized by the Court before the 1990 Smith 
decision). 
115. Id. at 2768. 
116. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
117. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69. 
118. Id. at 2769. 
119. See id. at 2708 (stating Congress indirectly employs the familiar legal fiction of corporation in 
RFRA, the purpose of which is to protect human shareholders). 
120. Id. at 2769. 
121. See id. (stating the exclusion of rights to corporations protects the free-exercise rights of the 
corporations and the religious liberty of the humans who own and control the corporations). 
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shareholders as a reason not to comply.122  The irrefutable truth that business 
corporations cannot exercise religion separate and apart from their owners is 
irrelevant.123  They act through their human shareholders, intended third-
party beneficiaries of Congressionally bestowed rights, who are the ones who 
pray, worship, observe sacraments, seek meaning and spiritual fulfillment, 
suffer the pangs of conscience, obey the commands of a higher authority, or 
obtain moral sanctuary from the evils of the world.124  
The moral sanctuary which the human shareholders of Hobby Lobby 
and Conestoga sought for their companies was relief from the evils of 
facilitating access of certain contraceptives to their employees.125  These anti-
contraceptive beliefs are religious in nature and part of a Christian and 
biblically-based value system which each set of owners perpetuated in the 
operation of their businesses, both in customer relations and in the delivery 
of employee benefits.126  The perpetuation of this value system constitutes 
the exercise of religion within the meaning of RFRA according to the 
majority.127  Invoking Smith’s noncontroversial observation that the exercise 
of religion includes belief, profession of belief, and performance of (or 
abstention from) acts,128 the Court found that the refusal to provide 
employees legally mandated no-cost contraceptive coverage based on 
Christian-based ethical objections “fell comfortably” within Smith’s 
description of religious exercise.129  
The Court’s triple play on the interpretation of RFRA, much like its 
baseball metaphorical counterpart, leaves an observer stunned and 
wondering how the event unfolded so quickly.  How can a restorative statute 
be transformed into one in which business corporations, never before thought 
to enjoy religious protection, now do?  How can the Dictionary Act’s 
definition of person include corporation but only in the sense of an osmotic 
membrane for the passage of the rights of shareholders, as long as those 
shareholders are human beings?  If Congress really wanted for-profit 
corporations, closely held by human shareholders, to enjoy the protections of 
the exercise of religion, why did it not just say so in plain English?  Or, if 
Congress wanted to limit the extension of religious rights to family-owned 
corporations, what prevented it from expressing that clearly and 
                                                                                                                           
122. See id. at 2769 (allowing corporations to assert RFRA claims furthers and protects the individual 
religious freedom of human shareholders). 
123. Id. at 2768. 
124. See id. (acknowledging individuals exercise religion through belief and action). 
125. Id. at 2765–66. 
126. Id. at 2771 n.73. 
127. Id. at 2769–70. 
128. Id. at 2770 (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 
(1990)). 
129. Id. 
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unambiguously?  Did Congress know, let alone foresee, that its silent and 
undefined treatment of “person” (a word never used in RFRA without a 
possessive qualifier) would be interpreted as a “corporation” under the 
Dictionary Act only to be “reversely pierced” in the same judicial breath to 
mean human shareholders?  The Court ignored the purpose of RFRA, 
misinterpreted the text, and displaced the tradition of free exercise.  Simply 
stated, it invented or re-wrote the statute.130  
B.  Text and Tradition Displaced 
The purpose of RFRA is expressly stated: To restore the compelling 
interest test of Sherbert and Yoder in situations where government 
substantially burdens a person’s free exercise of religion under the First 
Amendment.131  “Restore” is not defined in RFRA so we must look to a 
dictionary to ascertain the word’s ordinary, contemporary and common 
meaning.132  And to make sure we do not go too far astray in interpreting that 
ordinary meaning, we shall keep in mind the “acid test” proposed by Justice 
Scalia that whether a word can reasonably bear a particular meaning is best 
determined if you can use the word in the sense ascribed at a cocktail party 
without having people look at you funny.133  Although people at cocktail 
parties may not usually converse by reference to a word’s prefix, a group of 
rapt listeners would not look at you funny if you were to volunteer that the 
prefix “re” is a common one in the English language and denotes a return to 
a previous condition.134  Nor would faces crinkle in consternation if you were 
to propose that viable synonyms for “restore” include reinstate, renew, 
revive, revitalize, reestablish, reimpose, reconstruct, rehabilitate, or even, 
bring back, fix, or mend.135  So, if you happen to be attending a cocktail party 
on November 16, 1993, the date RFRA was enacted into law,136 you could 
say in a company of straight faces that Congress just fixed the holding in 
                                                                                                                           
130. See infra text accompanying notes 140–45, 162–98, 217–33. 
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
132. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (holding a fundamental canon of statutory 
construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning).  Over the past twenty-five years, the Court has substantially 
increased its use of dictionaries when construing text.  James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis 
or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 486 (2013).  Scholars link this use to the rise of textualism and its focus 
on ordinary meaning.  Id.  Not surprisingly, controversy has ensued on whether this judicial 
invocation of dictionary definitions is objective and authoritative or a subjective and, at times, 
result-oriented approach to statutory interpretation.  Id. at 486–87. 
133. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
134. Re Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/ 
 american_english/re? searchDictCode=all#RE (last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
135. ROGET’S 21ST CENTURY THESAURUS 712 (Barbara Ann Kipfer ed., 1992). 
136. RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, 1490 (1993). 
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Smith by reviving the compelling interest test.  That revitalization, you could 
accurately state, pertains to the test or standard itself; Congress did not 
address nor did it expand the class of persons who can engage in the protected 
exercise of religion, nor did it seek to extend the substantive boundaries of 
free exercise.137  Whatever free-exercise rights persons possessed prior to the 
passage of RFRA remain the same because exercise of religion is defined by 
and limited to the First Amendment.138  In other words, by defining “exercise 
of religion” as “the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution,” Congress made clear that persons who do not have First 
Amendment rights are not protected by RFRA.139  Simply stated, the ordinary 
meaning given to restoration of a balancing test cannot reasonably be 
interpreted to include an expansion of protected persons or an enlargement 
of underlying substantive rights.  
Nor is the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” enlightening.  Again, 
the operative principle is not “person.”140  The word “person” never stands 
alone or independent from “exercise of religion” in the text of RFRA.  It is 
used either as a singular noun in the possessive case (person’s exercise of 
religion)141 or in conjunction with a personal pronoun in the possessive case 
(person whose exercise of religion).142  Accordingly, “person” cannot be 
parsed alone; as it qualifies or modifies “exercise or religion” (which, in turn, 
is a defined term) the entire phrase, a person’s exercise of religion under the 
First Amendment, must be construed.143  That is a road sign Congress posted 
in the text of the statute.  And there are rules of the road (discussed infra) the 
Supreme Court has in place to assist in giving meaning to that phrase.144  But 
the Court ignored the clear and unambiguous language of the sign and 
selected a different path—the wrong path.  Because the entire foundation of 
the Court’s opinion rests on the unsupportable textual bifurcation of the 
operative phrase, the rationale of the opinion is likewise unsupportable.  By 
equating person with corporation, the Court began its interpretive journey 
down a “one-word” street, marked: WRONG WAY: DO NOT ENTER.  And 
during the course of this linguistic journey, the Court made some declarations 
on corporate formation and purpose which, although worthy of some 
                                                                                                                           
137. See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993) (stating the purpose of RFRA is only to overturn the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith, discrediting the notion that the Act could have unintentional 
consequences or unsettle other areas of the law). 
138. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 533 (2009) (Brown, J., concurring). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 533–34. 
141. RFRA§§ 3(a), (b), 107 Stat. at 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b) (2012)). 
142. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(b)(2), 2000bb-1(c). 
143. Gilardi v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d 1208, 1211–12 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014). 
144. See infra text and accompanying notes 162–69. 
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comment, are “quite beside the point.”145  In support of the “person is a 
corporation” thesis, the Court implies that Congress was fully knowledgeable 
about certain corporate principles when it chose not to define person.146 The 
Court set forth these principles in a semi-syllogistic format and without 
citation of authority:  
 A corporation is a legal fiction;147 
 It takes the form of an organization used by humans to achieve 
desired ends;148 
 The desired end of a business corporation is to make a profit;149 
 The purpose of the legal fiction is to provide protection for human 
beings;150 
 If rights are extended by Congress to business corporations, the 
purpose is to protect the corporation’s human shareholders;151 
 In RFRA Congress extended the right of free exercise of religion 
to all corporations;152 
 General business corporations cannot, separate and apart from the 
actions or belief systems of their human owners, exercise 
religion;153 
 Thus, when free-exercise rights are extended to business 
corporations, the purpose is really to protect the religious liberties 
of their human shareholders.154  
What is the Court really trying to say?  Is there a distinction (or not) 
between corporation and individual when it comes to religious exercise? 
Where does the answer lie?  It apparently does not lie with the concept of 
associational standing for that involves the redressing of members’ rights and 
injuries without a showing of injury to the association itself.155  Here, the 
                                                                                                                           
145. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (commenting that although true, 
it is quite beside the point that corporations cannot do anything at all, separate and apart from the 
human beings who own, run, and are employed by them). 
146. See id. at 2768 (stating Congress provides protection for the Hahns and Greens of the world through 
the use of the familiar legal fiction of corporation). 
147. Id. at 2768. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. See United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 
552 (1996) (defining the modern doctrine of associational standing as one in which an organization 
may sue to redress its members’ injuries, even without a showing of injury to the association itself). 
An illustration of this concept apropos to RFRA is found in Gonzales v. O’Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  There the Court affirmed the grant of a 
preliminary injunction under RFRA against the federal government in favor of a New Mexico 
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association or for-profit corporation is injured or directly affected by the 
contraception mandate.156  By not relying on Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission157 and the First Amendment right of corporations to 
express themselves for political purposes,158 the Court backs away from 
extending any constitutional free-exercise rights to corporations per se.159 
What the Court appears to be saying with its refrain of human shareholder 
protection is that at least on the “closely held corporate” facts before it, a 
unity of interest exists between corporation and individual that is indivisible. 
Stated otherwise, RFRA grants closely held, for-profit corporations religious 
rights of their own, rights which are informed and brought to life by the belief 
system of their human shareholders.160  Because the human shareholders 
oppose the use of contraception, the corporation’s obligation under the ACA 
to include contraceptive coverage in its workplace health insurance plan is 
understood as a burden on the owners’ religious liberty and, in turn, on the 
corporation itself.161  What a neat and tidy circle of logic, or more cynically 
phrased, a closely held corporate Catch-22. 
 Enough of the corporate wrong-way detour; back to the phrase actually 
posted on the Congressional road sign—a person’s exercise of religion under 
the First Amendment.  “The query is simple:  do corporations enjoy the 
shelter of the Free Exercise Clause?  Or is the free-exercise right a ‘purely 
personal’ one, such that it is unavailable to corporations and other 
organizations because ‘the historic function’ of the particular guarantee has 
been limited to the protections of individuals?”162  Several courts, judges, and 
even Hobby Lobby in its brief attempted to answer this query by looking to 
the “nature, history and purpose” of the Free Exercise Clause.163  These three 
                                                                                                                           
religious non-profit corporation which had sought equitable relief on behalf of its 130 members to 
permit them to engage in the sacramental practice of drinking hallucinogenic tea.  Id. at 433.  
156. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010). 
157. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
158. Id. at 342. 
159. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby did not back away from this position stating it saw 
no reason why the Court would not recognize constitutionally-based, for-profit corporate religious 
expression as it had already acknowledged First Amendment protection for corporate political 
expression.  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc), 
aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
160. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 688 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
161. Id. 
162. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d 1208, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014). 
163. Id.; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724 
F.3d 377, 384-85, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. 
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 626 (6th Cir. 2013), 
cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded sub nom., Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. 
Ct. 2901 (2014); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1168 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Korte, 735 F.3d at 696-98 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., 
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factors or rules of the constitutional road, if you will, demonstrate that only 
individuals and communities of believers, not secular corporations, enjoy the 
shelter of the Free Exercise Clause.  The heritage of religious liberty in this 
country centers around an individual’s religious conscience and a community 
of believers.164  The Supreme Court has accorded protection consistent with 
this original design.  Individuals, clergy, religious entities and organizations, 
sects and congregations, and religiously affiliated educational associations 
all have been held to fall under the umbrella of potential First Amendment 
protection against government interference.165  One need look no further than 
Smith, in which the Court provides a litany of case law and situations in 
which the government either had overstepped its bounds in attempting to 
regulate religious belief or surely would be prohibited from regulating certain 
religiously motivated actions or abstinence from physical acts.166  Each 
prohibited government regulation or purported prohibition—compelling 
affirmation of religious belief; punishing the expression of religious 
doctrines it believes to be false; imposing special disabilities on the basis of 
religious views or status; lending its power to one or the other side in 
controversies over religious authority or dogma; “assembling with others for 
a worship service; participating in sacramental use of bread and wine; 
proselytizing; [and] abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of 
transportation”—involves individuals, religious clergy, or religious 
entities.167  In fact the Court in Smith used the word “individual” several times 
in discussing the nature of First Amendment protection.168  More recently, 
the Court echoed the community of believers’ concept by noting the text of 
the First Amendment gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.169  
 In contrast, nothing in the text of the First Amendment, Congress’s 
debates, the historical context of the amendment’s ratification, or any 
Supreme Court case suggests that artificial creatures of the law, incorporated 
to make money while limiting the liability of its shareholders, are deserving 
                                                                                                                           
dissenting); Brief of Respondent at 24, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., aff’d sub nom., 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354). 
164. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1212-13.  See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of the Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1488–90 (1990) (noting the 
substitution of “free exercise of religion” for the “rights of conscience” in the constitutional 
formulation signifies a desire to protect a community of believers or religious bodies from 
governmental interference in addition to and even when the interference has no direct relation to a 
claim of conscience). 
165. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1212–13. 
166. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990). 
167. Id. 
168. Id.  
169. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.. 694, 706 (2012). 
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of constitutional religious protection.170  Unlike religious organizations, 
which exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious 
faith, workers who sustain the operations of for-profit corporations are not 
commonly drawn from one religious community.171  In the pursuit of profit, 
shareholders are not acting in their capacity as members of a religious 
congregation or parishioners of a church.  They do not comprise an 
association of individuals joined together for a common religious purpose.172 
They are investors, authorized by state law to issue stock and form a separate 
legal entity, in the hopes of generating a positive monetary return on their 
investment.173  
 Hobby Lobby attempts to seek shelter under the Free Exercise Clause 
by arguing that an individual’s freedom to worship cannot be “vigorously 
protected from interference by the [government] unless a correlative freedom 
to engage in [a] group effort toward those ends [are] not also guaranteed.”174 
While there may be some truth in this observation, Hobby Lobby and the 
Court steadfastly refuse to acknowledge that the nature, purpose and history 
of this correlative freedom relates to a community of believers who bring 
themselves together to believe, profess, worship, and engage in sacramental 
activities.175  There is no religious tradition for secular corporations, 
                                                                                                                           
170. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the Court had never, until today, extended religious exemptions to any entity operating 
in the commercial, profit-making world); Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1212–13 (summarizing the history 
of purpose of the Free Exercise Clause as encompassing only individuals and religious bodies, not 
for-profit corporations); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health 
and Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377, 384–85, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (questioning how the Free Exercise Clause, designed to 
secure religious liberty for the individual, can be interpreted to include within its umbrella of 
protection a for-profit artificial being that is created to make money). 
171. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
172. Ron Fein, Why Every Single Supreme Court Justice Got Hobby Lobby Wrong, JURIST (Sept. 18, 
2014, 12:00 PM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2014/09/ron-fein-hobby-lobby.php.  
173. Id. 
174. Brief for Respondents at 24, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609, 622 (1984)). 
175. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (commenting on majority’s 
forgetfulness for not recognizing that religious organizations exist to serve and perpetuate religious 
values shared by a community of believers).  From a Christian theological perspective, H. Richard 
Niebuhr has expressed the role of churches succinctly and eloquently:  “The purpose of the Church 
is to increase among human beings the love of God and neighbor.”  H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE 
PURPOSE OF THE CHURCH AND ITS MINISTRY 31 (1977).  Or, as voiced by the eminent theologian 
Paul Tillich, one to whom the Court had looked for guidance in explaining the concept of religion 
in the conscientious objector case of United States. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180 (1965):  
[T]he Church gave an antidote against the threat of anxiety and despair, namely itself, 
its traditions, its sacraments, its education, and its authority.  The anxiety of guilt was 
taken into the courage to be as a part of the sacramental community.  The anxiety of 
doubt was taken into the courage to be as a part of the community in which revelation 
and reason are united. 
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consisting of shareholders, officers, employees, or others associated 
therewith.176  They have diverse personal beliefs, diverse degrees of religious 
devotion, diverse moral compasses, and perhaps diverse notions as to 
whether and how corporations ought to reflect their “ultimate concerns” in 
business operations.177  
More fundamentally, what distinguishes for-profits from religious non-
profits is the utilization of labor for financial gain rather than the perpetuation 
of a religious value-based mission.178  Employees provide that labor, and by 
accepting that labor, for-profit corporations submit to legislation designed to 
promote employee welfare.179  This is the associational dynamic of for-
profits—a far cry from joining your hands with fellow congregants in prayer 
at a Sunday morning worship service or partaking of the sacraments, whether 
it be taking Holy Communion at a Catholic service or ingesting peyote at a 
Native American sacred gathering.  The First Amendment is a prism through 
which the validity of these claims are viewed, not the categorical imperative 
of statutory definitional consistency as myopically reflected by a small sliver 
of the corporate world which coincidentally happens to be closely held, 
familial and unanimous in their pro-life beliefs.  Although admitting that 
Congress knows how to write a statute which links the meaning of a provision 
to a constitutional source,180 the Court refuses to apply this rudimentary 
principle to its interpretation of RFRA.  
The Court believes it is justified in doing so because it is “obvious [the 
2000 amendment to RFRA effectuated] a complete separation from First 
Amendment case law.”181  It is true Congress deleted the reference to the First 
Amendment when defining religious exercise.  It is also true the definition 
                                                                                                                           
 PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE 95 (1952). 
176. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the discrete and different 
characteristics of ecclesiastical and lay corporations dating back to the time of Blackstone in the 
mid-eighteenth century). 
177. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 704 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
178. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d 1208, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Edwards, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 
134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014).  In emphasizing definitional consistency in its opinion, the Court noted no 
less than five times the government conceded that non-profit corporations are persons under RFRA. 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769, 2769 n.20, 2771, 2774.  True, but beside the point, the Solicitor 
General argued at oral argument, for the query is not who or what is a person within the meaning 
of RFRA, but rather what is the meaning of the phrase “person’s exercise of religion.”  Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 48, 51, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354, 13-356).  See supra text 
accompanying notes 162–63. 
179. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1242–43 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (holding when followers of a particular sect enter into 
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter 
of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on 
others in that activity).  
180. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2772. 
181. Id. at 2761–62. 
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changed colors—from one importing a meaning (“‘the exercise of religion’ 
means the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution”)182 to one conveying inclusiveness (“‘religious exercise’ 
includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, 
a system of religious belief”).183 The circumstances leading up to and 
surrounding the amendment, however, appear to support a conclusion far less 
sweeping and grandiose than that announced by the Court.  As discussed 
previously, RLUIPA was enacted in response to the Court’s decision in 1997 
that Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers under section five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in mandating state compliance with RFRA.184  Three 
years later, Congress turned to its powers under the Commerce and Spending 
clauses to justify application of the compelling-interest test to two categories 
of state action—land use regulation and management of institutionalized 
persons.185  And while Congress was correcting the error of its constitutional 
ways, it took the opportunity to fix the mistake lower federal courts had been 
making since 1993 in imposing proof of centrality on prisoners’ claims of 
infringement under RFRA.186  It effectively directed courts to return to the 
                                                                                                                           
182. RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 5(4), 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993). 
183. RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 8, 114 Stat. 803, 806 (2000) (amending section 5 of RFRA). 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 50–51. 
185. RLUIPA §§ 2, 3, 114 Stat. at 803–04.  See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005) 
(recognizing that Congress limited the reach of RLUIPA to two subjects, invoking its authority over 
each by reliance on the Spending and Commerce Clauses). 
186. See Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring proof by a prisoner that the 
government is preventing a religious experience that the faith mandates); Werner v. McCotter, 49 
F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute, RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 
803 (noting that governmental regulation must substantially burden religious activity that manifests 
some central tenet of a prisoner’s individual beliefs or denies a prisoner a reasonable opportunity to 
engage in activities that are fundamental to a person’s religion); Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of 
Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute, RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 
Stat. 803 (rejecting RFRA claim by prisoner that an essential tenet of his religious beliefs was 
substantially burdened); Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996), superseded by 
statute, RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803(recognizing that the substantial burden 
requirement of RFRA must inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that manifests a central tenet 
of religious belief or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs); Weir v. Nix, 
114 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1997), superseded by statute, RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 
803 (adopting the language of the Tenth Circuit in Werner).  In a case not involving a prisoner, the 
Fourth Circuit held that a parents’ economic burden, incurred due to the failure of the school board 
to provide a cued speech transliterator to their hearing-impaired child at his religious school at no 
cost, was not substantial.  The Fourth Circuit found the parents and child were neither compelled to 
engage in conduct prescribed by religious beliefs, nor forced to abstain from any action their 
religion mandates they take.  Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford Cnty. Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172 (4th 
Cir. 1995). 
 Ironically, the Court contributed to the confusion surrounding the substantial burden element with 
some sloppy dicta in Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).  In re-citing the elements of the 
compelling-interest test, the Court described the substantial burden as one which relates to a “central 
religious belief or practice.”  Id. at 699.  This description, of course, was contrary to precedent. 
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990); Thomas v. Review 
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status quo ante.187  The amendment was not a change so much as a 
“clarif[ication of] issues that had generated litigation under RFRA.”188 
Congress made clear that neither compulsion nor centrality is an essential 
feature of a religious belief system.189  This clarification was incorporated 
into RFRA to ensure uniformity in enforcement.190  There is simply no 
indication that the “any exercise of religion” phrase in the 2000 amendment 
was intended to broaden the universe of persons protected by RFRA.191 
Moreover, the absence of “First Amendment” in the 2000 definition 
clarification of religious exercise is not the unambiguous and revolutionary 
game-changer the Court makes it out to be.192  The Court claims its 
responsibility is to interpret RFRA as written.193  If true, the Court would see 
what an ambiguous mess Congress made out of the two statutes in providing 
guidance on how “religious exercise” is to be construed.  RLUIPA, chapter 
21C of Title 42 of the United States Code, contains a rule of construction; 
RFRA, chapter 21B of Title 42, does not. The rule of construction for 
RLUIPA provides:  “This Act shall be construed in favor of a broad 
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the 
terms of this Act and the Constitution.”194  The absence of such a rule—or 
any rule of construction for that matter—in RFRA means that only persons 
affected by two limited categories of state governmental activity are entitled 
to have their form of religious exercise construed to the maximum extent 
permitted by the Constitution.  This does not make a lick of sense.195  Why 
                                                                                                                           
Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-06 (1979); 
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 450 (1969); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85–87 (1944). 
187. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2792 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
188. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 30 (1999). 
189. See id. (noting religious exercise need not be compulsory or central to the claimant’s religious belief 
system). 
190. Id.  Also incorporated into RFRA was the second part of RLUIPA’s definition of “religious 
exercise,” namely, that “[t]he use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of 
religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or 
intends to use the property for that purpose.”  RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 8, 114 Stat. 803, 
806 (amending section 5 of RFRA). 
191. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
192. See id. at 2761–62 (stating the reference to the First Amendment in RLUIPA and in the 2000 
amendment to RFRA constitutes an obvious effort by Congress to effectuate a complete separation 
from First Amendment case law).  
193. Id. at 2785. 
194. RLUIPA § 5(g), 114 Stat. at 806 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-3(g) (2012)). 
195. The Court attempts to avoid this nonsense by arguing that the mere incorporation of RLUIPA’s 
definition of religious exercise into the text of RFRA carries with it RLUIPA’s broad rule of 
construction. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762 n.5.  Stated otherwise, the Court claims the rule of 
construction rides piggy-back on top of the definition when the latter is incorporated into the text 
of RFRA.  This claim is belied by the fact that the language of the rule of construction is anchored 
to the RLUIPA chapter itself, and that RFRA, a separate chapter in the United States Code, contains 
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should state prisoners and religious institutions that are affected by local land 
use regulation be entitled to have their claims of religious exercise construed 
more broadly than claims by all other classes of persons victimized by federal 
governmental activity? 
Congress did not intend such an absurd and inconsistent rule of 
construction.  Nor did it intend the deletion of the reference to the First 
Amendment in the 2000 clarifying amendment to carry revolutionary weight. 
In the same paragraph of the House report in which the authors explain the 
need for clarification, they note that “religious exercise” under both RFRA 
and RLUIPA includes only conduct that is the exercise of religion under the 
First Amendment.196  Rather than construing the absence of the First 
Amendment in the text of the 2000 amendment of RFRA as a Congressional 
takeover of the most cherished amendment, rendering moot more than 200 
years of constitutional protection against actions of the federal government, 
the omission should be viewed as a legislative clarifying error, an inadvertent 
deletion of the textual hook which had always precluded persons who did not 
have First Amendment rights from asserting RFRA claims.197  Did Congress 
really intend to hide an elephant of revolutionary religious change in a mouse 
hole of an incorporated statutory phrase?198  Yes, the Court effectively 
answers, creating a schizophrenic world of religious exercise between a 
limited class of “state” RLUIPA persons protected by a broad rule of 
construction and an expansive class of RFRA “federal” persons with no such 
protection. 
C.  Don’t Blame Us 
Wrapping up its opinion in Hobby Lobby, the Court writes: “The 
wisdom of Congress’s judgment on this matter is not our concern.  Our 
responsibility is to enforce RFRA as written, and under the standard that 
RFRA prescribes, the HHS contraceptive mandate . . . as applied to closely 
                                                                                                                           
no omnibus rule of construction governing the statute in its entirety.  Id. at 2792 n.10 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  
196. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 30 (1999). 
197. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Brown, J., concurring). 
198. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Congress does not ‘hide elephants 
in mouseholes’”) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).  
Moreover, why would Congress confuse its revolution by incorporating into the text of RFRA the 
entirety of RLUIPA’s definition of “religious exercise” that “[t]he use, building, or conversion of 
real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the 
person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that purpose.”  Did Congress want to 
make sure the use of real property for religious purposes would be protected the same under RFRA 
as RLUIPA?  Was such incorporation necessary in view of the all-encompassing scope of the “any 
exercise of religion” phrase?  The Court did not address these questions. 
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held corporations, violates RFRA.”199  In their words, we [the Court] just 
read the plain language of the text of the statute; we are not dispensing 
constitutional justice.  In fact we ruled twenty-four years ago that applying 
the compelling-interest test to constitutional free-exercise claims “would 
open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from 
civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”200  Congress disagreed 
with our constitutional judgment, wrote a statute resurrecting the compelling-
interest standard, amending it once along the way.  With the guidance of The 
Dictionary Act, we have interpreted the statute, and our job is done.  If you 
do not like the result, do not blame us; we told you so twenty-four years ago.  
The Court’s blame avoidance is not so simple.  Congressional 
restoration of the compelling-interest test is not the same thing as a purported 
Congressional bestowment of free-exercise rights on closely held 
corporations, passed through to human shareholders in pursuit of for-profit 
business goals.  Reliance on The Dictionary Act, premised on a bifurcation 
of the phrase, “person’s exercise of religion,” raises an issue of a result-
oriented approach to statutory interpretation.201  Bifurcation provides a 
foothold to for-profits to assert they are the proper “persons” under RFRA to 
challenge the contraceptive mandate.  The Court ignores one of the basic 
principles of corporate law, 
The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the 
corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and 
responsibilities due to its different legal status. . . . After all, incorporation’s 
basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, 
obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural 
individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs.202  
The Court brushes aside this traditional principle.  Instead, it announces 
the only purpose behind a Congressional extension of corporate statutory 
rights is human shareholder protection,203 rendering moot over two centuries 
of First Amendment protection against federal government interference.204  
Why not go down the textually true path of a “person’s exercise of 
religion” and debate, as the District of Columbia Circuit did, whether the 
                                                                                                                           
199. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.  Characterizing the mandate as HHS’s is consistent with the 
Court’s framing of the issue as opposed to the verbiage expressed in the petitions for writ of 
certiorari.  See supra text accompanying notes 110–11.  
200. Id. (quoting Emp’t. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990)). 
201. See supra note 132. 
202. Cedric Kushner Promotions Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). 
203. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
204. See id. at 2761–62 (stating the 2000 amendment to RFRA was an obvious effort to effect a complete 
separation from First Amendment case law). 
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personal anti-contraceptive beliefs of the corporation’s owners are 
substantially burdened by the mandate?205  There is no mystery that owners 
are persons as distinguished from animals or things;206 that they meet the 
three requirements of Article III standing (injury in fact, causation, and 
redress of injury);207 that prudential considerations of standing, such as the 
shareholder standing rule,208 do not apply;209 and that unnecessary 
digressions into corporate form, public v. closely held applicability, the 
purpose of bestowment of statutory corporate rights, and the talk of 
discrimination against corporations as compared to sole proprietorships and 
partnerships, can be avoided.210  All the “dramatic consequences”211 that go 
with these digressions can likewise be avoided.  
There is likewise little mystery that personal anti-contraceptive 
beliefs—tied as they are to how human shareholders conduct their 
businesses—are touched, affected, and indeed burdened by the mandate.212 
But is the burden substantial?  That is the question that needed to be debated 
and decided.  It certainly was brought to the table by the shareholders in 
Gilardi, arguing that the government was forcing, coaxing, penalizing, 
making, (fill in your participle of choice), them to participate and become 
compliant in the commission of a grave moral wrong.213  In assessing the 
merits of this claim, courts are precluded, of course, from questioning its 
plausibility.214  But courts can and should consider that religious beliefs of 
shareholders are inextricably bound to a pursuit of a morally acceptable 
business life, that owners are not required to use or purchase contraceptives 
nor prohibited from publically expressing their disapproval of contraceptive 
use, and that the mandate does not encourage employees to use 
contraceptives any more than the payment of wages require purchase of such 
drugs at the corner pharmacy.215  This debate never occurred.  
                                                                                                                           
205. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d 1208, 1212–15, 1217–19 (D.C. Cir. 
2013); id. at 1227–31, 1237–39 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014). 
206. Id. at 1215.  
207. Id. at 1228 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Standing to assert a claim or 
defense under RFRA is specifically governed by Article III by the Constitution. RFRA, Pub. L. No. 
103-141, § 3(c), 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(c) (2012)). 
208. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 336 (1990). 
209. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1230-31 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
210. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2667-70 (2014). 
211. Id. at 2767. 
212. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1231 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
213. Id. at 1218. 
214. See supra text and accompanying notes 186–89. 
215. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1237–39 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Instead, an “argle-bargle”216 on closely held corporations is offered: 
persons are closely held corporations; closely held corporations, standing 
alone, cannot exercise religion; and human shareholders are the intended 
beneficiaries of religious liberties formally extended to and bestowed upon 
fictitious corporate shells.217  Fewer than half the states have a statutorily 
created corporate form, a “close corporation,” and even for the states that do, 
the definition of and requirements for such a business vary.218  What the 
Court is really saying is that a “person” under RFRA is a corporation via The 
Dictionary Act only if it exhibits the following characteristics: 
1. It is entirely family-owned;
2. It consists of a small number of shareholders;
3. The shareholders and the board of directors are co-extensive;
4. The family/shareholders/directors are unanimous in their religious
connections;
5. The family/shareholders/directors are unanimous in wishing to
seek an exemption from the contraception coverage requirement;
and
6. The companies have long held themselves out to employees,
customers and the public as companies operating under religious
216. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting on the 
majority’s opinion in Windsor holding unconstitutional the heterosexual definition of marriage in 
the Defense of Marriage Act).
217. See supra text and accompanying notes 115–24, 147–54. 
218. Comment on the definition of “eligible organization” for purposes of Coverage of Certain 
Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act (Oct. 21, 2014), available at 
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/prpcp_comments_on 
_proposed_regs_corp_law_profs_for_submission.pdf. After an eleven-month comment period 
and the receipt of more than 75,000 comments, the government published a final set of 
regulations on the definition of “eligible organization” as it pertains to a “closely held for-profit 
entity.”  See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. 
Reg.  41318, 41324, 41346-47 (published July 14, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C. F. R. 147.131 (b) 
(2) (ii), (b) (4).  In addition to the obvious features of not being a nonprofit entity and not being 
publicly traded, a closely held for-profit entity must have more than 50 per cent of the value of 
its ownership interest owned directly or indirectly by five or fewer individuals or have an 
ownership structure that is substantially similar thereto.  Id. at 41346.  Various rules exist with 
respect to performing the calculation. First, ownership interests owned by a corporation, 
partnership, estate or trust are considered owned proportionately by such entity’s shareholders, 
partners, or beneficiaries while ownership interests owned by a nonprofit entity are considered 
owned by a single owner.  Id. Second, an individual is considered to own the ownership interests 
owned, directly or indirectly, by or for his or her family.  Id. at 41347.  Family includes only 
brothers and sisters (including half-brothers and half-sisters), a spouse, ancestors, and lineal 
descendants. Id.  Finally, if a person holds an option to purchase ownership interests, he or she is 
considered to be the owner of those ownership interests. Id. With respect to claiming an 
exemption and accommodation, the organization’s highest governing body (such as its board of 
directors, board of trustees, or owners, if managed directly by its owners) must adopt a 
resolution or similar action, under the organization’s applicable rules of governance and 
consistent with state law, establishing its objections based on the owners’ sincerely held religious 
beliefs.  Id. at 41346.  
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principles that constrain their business behavior in accordance 
with the religious beliefs of the shareholders.219 
This brings to mind Humpty Dumpty scornfully lecturing Alice on the 
nature of semantics: “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to 
mean—neither more nor less.”220  A new reality for the fictional world of 
corporations now exists.  “Puzzling,” Alice may have responded, or because 
it fails his cocktail party “acid test,”221 Justice Scalia’s own soft epithet of 
“jaw-dropping” may be most apropos.222  
Having judicially canonized corporate free exercise, the Court then 
proceeded to determine that shareholders’ religious liberties were 
substantially burdened by financial penalties imposed for non-compliance 
with the mandate,223 and that although no-cost contraceptive care may serve 
a compelling governmental interest,224 it could be effected by a means less 
restrictive than requiring these shareholders to fund contraceptive methods 
in a manner that violates their religious beliefs.225  And there just happened 
to be a less restrictive alternative in place, a self-certification exemption 
offered by HHS to religious employers that still ensured employees and their 
dependents no-cost care.226  This is what the Court was talking about in its 
opening remarks about an expansion of the exemption having “precisely 
                                                                                                                           
219. Id. at 2.  An interesting example of the fallout of including for-profits within the definition of person 
in a religious freedom statute recently occurred in Indiana.  The Indiana Legislature had specifically 
defined person in the Religious Freedom Restoration statute to include an individual; an 
organization organized and operated primarily for religious purposes; and a corporation, 
partnership, limited liability company, or any other entity that may sue or be sued and that exercises 
practices that are compelled or limited by a system of religious belief held by individual(s) who 
have control and substantial ownership of the entity.  See Ind. Code §34-13-9-7 (Effective July 1, 
2015).  Faced with an avalanche of negative publicity surrounding the potential use of the statute 
as a tool to discriminate, primarily on the basis of sexual orientation, the legislature quickly 
amended the statute to add a definition of “provider” which essentially included for-profits and 
excluded religious organizations and their clergy and  then further amended the statute to prohibit 
a provider from refusing to offer or provide services, facilities, the use of public accommodations, 
and goods on the basis, inter alia, of race, sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity.  See Ind. 
Code §34-13-9-0.7 and §34-13-9-7.5. (Effective July 1. 2015). 
220. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 
186 (New American Library 1960).  Judicial references to Alice’s wonderings number well over 
1,000, her encounter with Mr. Dumpty being one of the most frequently cited.  Parker B. Potter, Jr., 
Wondering About Alice: Judicial References to Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking-
Glass, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 175, 176–77 (2006). 
221. See supra text accompanying note 133. 
222. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
223. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76, 2779 (2014) (noting that if the 
group health plans do not cover the contraceptives at issue, the corporate plaintiffs will be taxed 
$100 per day for each affected individual, which in Hobby Lobby’s case would amount to $475 
million per year).  
224. Id. at 2780. 
225. Id. at 2872. 
226. Id. 
504 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 39 
zero” impact on female employees of Hobby Lobby and other corporate 
plaintiffs.227  That may be true, but in dicta leading up to this finding of a less 
restrictive approach, the Court chartered a path for corporate employers and 
religious non-profits to claim an exemption from the exemption-notification 
process, an impact that is anything but precisely zero.228  In fact, its impact, 
if fully implemented, constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause.229 
The Court wasted no time taking its first step down this path when, three days 
after deciding Hobby Lobby, it issued a temporary injunction prohibiting 
HHS from requiring a religious employer to certify its religious objections to 
the mandate on a government-issued form and to send a copy of the 
completed form to the third-party administrator of its health-insurance 
plan.230  But we are getting ahead of ourselves.  First, we must discuss the 
Hobby Lobby dicta. 
V.  THE PROCESS OF EXEMPTION, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,  
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Before identifying the HHS accommodative approach as the basis for 
its lesser-restrictive-means holding, the Court in Hobby Lobby had a few 
choice words to say about the viability of no-cost healthcare legislation 
within the context of a strict scrutiny analysis.  And the Court was not 
positive: 
The most straightforward way [of the Government achieving its desired 
goal of cost-free contraceptive care] would be for [it] to assume the cost of 
providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to 
obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers’ 
religious objections.  This would certainly be less restrictive of the 
plaintiffs’ religious liberty, and HHS has not shown . . . that this is not a 
viable alternative.231 
Subsidizing, in whole or in part, the cost of contraceptive drugs and 
devices, the Court added, may even warrant the creation of entirely new 
legislative programs in order to satisfy the least restrictive command of the 
RFRA strict scrutiny test.232 
                                                                                                                           
227. See id. at 2760 (“The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women employed by Hobby 
Lobby and other companies involved in these cases would be precisely zero.”). 
228. See infra notes 232–33, 253, 268–70 and accompanying text.  
229. See infra notes 271–77 and accompanying text. 
230. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2807. 
231. Id. at 2780. 
232. Id. at 2781.  Justice Ginsburg took objection to what she characterized as this “let the government 
pay” alternative, arguing it would impede women’s receipt of benefits “by requiring them to take 
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Minimizing the potential fallout of this stark dictum, Justice Kennedy 
added a concurring comment.233  He emphasized that the Court, although 
discussing Hobby Lobby’s argument that the Government should pay for the 
objectionable drugs and devices, withheld judgment on whether this is a 
“proper response to a legitimate claim for freedom in the health care 
arena.”234  And echoing Establishment Clause concerns of a unanimous court 
in Cutter v. Wilkinson,235 he observed that a person’s free exercise of religion 
may not “unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their 
own interests, interests the law deems compelling.”236 
So the question remains: will the self-certification process, if 
challenged directly, satisfy the least-restrictive means test while still 
providing precisely zero impact to female employees covered under an 
employer’s group health plan?  The first hint came three days later with the 
issuance of an emergency injunction by the Court in Wheaton College v. 
Burwell.237  Wheaton College, a religious non-profit entity clearly exempt 
from the mandate, asserted the exemption itself impermissibly burdened its 
free-exercise rights under RFRA on the theory that sending the government-
issued form to the third-party administrator of its health plan made it 
compliant in providing contraceptive services by triggering the obligation of 
the administrator to provide the services to which it objects.238  The language 
of the government form, EBSA Form 700, requires an authorized 
representative of the organization to certify that the health coverage it 
establishes, maintains, or arranges, qualifies for a religious accommodation 
from providing contraceptives sources without cost sharing.239  The form 
then directs the organization to provide a copy of the certification to its health 
insurance issuer or third-party administrator, as the case may be, “in order 
for the plan to be accommodated with respect to the contraceptive coverage 
                                                                                                                           
steps to learn about, and to sign up for, a new [government funded and administered] heath benefit,” 
a step Congress did not contemplate.  Id. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Coverage of 
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,888 (July 2, 2013)). 
233. Id. at 2785–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
234. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786. 
235. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).  In Cutter, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
RLUIPA from a facial attack by prison officials that the accommodation of prisoners’ religious 
rights violated the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 720.  The Court noted, however, that in properly 
applying RLUIPA, courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation 
may impose on non-beneficiaries.  Id.  
236. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy believes HHS carried 
its burden to show the mandate serves a compelling governmental interest in providing insurance 
coverage that is necessary to protect the health of female employees.  Id. at 2785–86.  Although the 
four dissenters agree, five votes exist to support an actual finding of fact that the first prong of the 
RFRA strict scrutiny test is satisfied.  Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
237. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014). 
238. Id. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
239. Id. at 2816 (Appendix). 
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requirement.”240  With all three female justices dissenting, the Court issued a 
conditional injunction: if Wheaton College informed HHS in writing of its 
eligibility for a religious exemption, it need not use Form 700 nor need it 
send a copy of the form to its third-party administrator, and HHS would be 
enjoined from enforcing the pertinent provisions of the mandate pending 
final disposition of appellate review.241  The interlocutory injunction was 
issued pursuant to the All Writs Act.242  Interestingly, the last two Chief 
Justices of the Court had previously declared that injunctions issued under 
this statue, to block the operation of a duly enacted law and regulation, in 
cases where the courts below had not yet adjudicated the merits and where 
the courts had declined request for similar injunctive relief, were proper only 
if the legal writs at issue were indisputably clear.243   
Justice Sotomayor authored a blistering dissent, which was joined by 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan.244   
Those who are bound by our decisions usually believe they can take us at 
our word.  Not so today.  After expressly relying on the availability of the 
religious-nonprofit accommodation to hold that the contraceptive coverage 
requirement violates RFRA as applied to closely held for-profit 
corporations, the Court now, as the dissent in Hobby Lobby feared it might, 
retreats from that position.  That action evinces disregard for even the 
newest of this Court’s precedents and undermines confidence in this 
institution.245  
After all, as Justice Sotomayor notes, RFRA requires Wheaton to show 
accommodation “substantially burden[s] [its] exercise of religion.”  Can it be 
that availing itself of the very accommodation designed to prevent its 
participation in administering contraceptive services is a substantial burden? 
In a word, no.  That is because the law requires some entity provide 
contraceptive coverage.  The operation of law imposes the guarantee of 
contraceptive coverage—not a religious non-profit’s election not to be the 
entity that provides coverage.  And, even if the minimally burdensome 
paperwork necessary for the Government to administer the accommodation 
could be deemed substantial, then it is the least restrictive means.246  As 
Justice Sotomayor points out, the Court has no business rewriting 
                                                                                                                           
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 2807. 
242. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). 
243. Lux v. Rodrigues, 131 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 507 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers). 
244. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
246. Id. at 2808.  
246. Id. at 2814. 
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administrative schemes,247 and even if it did, the Court’s scheme of using two 
stamps (where the non-profit who wishes to be exempt notifies DHS, who 
then has to notify the unnamed third-party administrator) as opposed to one 
(the nonprofit notifies its third-party administrator directly on the simple 
form provided) does anything but make the accommodation process easier.248 
Justice Sotomayor concluded the Court failed to appreciate “a simple truth: 
The Government must be allowed to handle the basic tasks of public 
administration in a manner that comports with common sense.”249   
The grant of an interlocutory injunction in Wheaton College was by no 
means the final word and may well have raised more questions than it 
answered: 
 What are the rights of Wheaton College that are “indisputably 
clear?”   
 What part of RFRA puts on hold the “written equivalent of raising 
a hand in response to the government’s query as to which religious 
organizations want to opt out[?]”250   
 Does the Wheaton College injunction strengthen the Hobby Lobby 
dicta and foreshadow how the Court will deal with objections to 
the exemption notification process and thus, to the future viability 
of the mandate?   
 If the objections are upheld on the merits, does that amount to an 
“unlawful fostering of religion?” 
 Will the recent HHS regulation of an alternative notice process 
make a difference?   
 How will Justice Kennedy untie the Gordian knot of the “let the 
government pay”251 polemic, as voiced by the other four members 
of the Hobby Lobby majority and the four dissenters?252 
Some religious employers appear to think the Hobby Lobby dicta is their 
legal ticket to salvation from complicity in the grave moral evil of facilitating 
contraception through participation in the exemption notification process.  It 
was the cornerstone of their less-restrictive alternative pitch to the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals in the first federal appellate case to reach the 
merits of the validity of the HHS regulation promulgated after the Wheaton 
College injunction.253   
                                                                                                                           
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 2815. 
249. Id. 
250. Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
251. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
252. See supra notes 232–37 and accompanying text. 
253. Joint Supplemental Brief of Appellants at 19, Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5368). 
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Priests for Life v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services254 
forms the jumping-off point as to why religious objections to providing 
contact information to an insurance representative or a third-party 
administrator do not constitute a substantial burden on religious exercise and 
why any argument that they do, runs afoul of the Establishment Clause. 
There, eleven Catholic organizations (who employ both Catholics and 
non-Catholics) in the D.C. area claimed the regulatory accommodation that 
permitted them to opt out of the contraceptive coverage requirement under 
the ACA itself, imposed an unjustified substantial burden on plaintiffs' 
religious exercise in violation of RFRA.255  Plaintiffs asserted that the notice 
they submit in requesting accommodation is a “trigger” that activates 
substitute coverage, and that the government will “hijack” their health plans 
and use them as “conduits” for providing contraceptive coverage to their 
employees and students.256  Plaintiffs claimed the government has no 
compelling interest in requiring notice of their desire to opt out and has not 
shown the notice requirement is the least restrictive means.”257  The D.C. 
Circuit disagreed.   
The court stated that notice was not a substantial burden on the 
objector.258  Rather, completing the one-page form was the equivalent to 
raising a hand in response to a government query.259  And the suggestion by 
plaintiffs that submitting the one-page form implicated them in the process 
of providing contraceptive coverage was also meritless.260  Burdens that fall 
to third parties are not substantial burdens.261  And here, the opt-out 
(accommodation) shifts to the government, a third party, the obligation to 
insure for female contraceptive services (the requirement the objector 
opposes).  At bottom, the free exercise of religion does not allow a religious 
objector to dictate Government conduct simply because it offends sincerely 
254. After the HHS regulation of August 27, 2014, the process of exemption, as stated by the Court in 
Priests for Life, “works simply:”
A religious organization that objects on religious grounds to including coverage for 
contraception in its health plan may so inform either the entity that issues or administers 
its group health plan or the Department of Health and Human Services.  Delivery of the 
requisite notice extinguishes the religious organization's obligation to contract, arrange, 
pay, or refer for any coverage that includes contraception.  The regulations then require 
group health plan insurers or administrators to offer separate coverage for contraceptive 
services directly to insured women who want them, and to inform beneficiaries that the 
objecting employer has no role in facilitating that coverage. 
772 F.3d at 236. 
255. Id. at 239. 
256. Id. at 237. 
257. Id.
258. Id. at 247. 
259. Id. at 250. 
260. Id. at 252. 
261. Id. at 248.
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held religious sensibilities, as incidental effects of government programs that 
do not coerce individuals to act in a manner contrary to their religious beliefs 
are permissible.262  The “act” here is filling out a form, which is not against 
Catholic beliefs, and the beneficiaries receive coverage—not due to the opt-
out form but rather because the ACA imposes that obligation.263  In fact, the 
court characterized the alleged burden of the opt-out Form “a single sheet of 
paper” as “de minimis.”264   
In short, the substantial burden argument is groundless:  
Religious objectors do not suffer substantial burdens under RFRA where 
the only harm to them is that they sincerely feel aggrieved by their inability 
to prevent what other people would do to fulfill regulatory objectives after 
they opt out.  They have no RFRA right to be free from the unease, or even 
anguish, of knowing that third parties are legally privileged or obligated to 
act in ways their religion abhors. . . . “Government simply could not operate 
if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires.”265 
Thus, RFRA was no aid to the Priests for Life objectors because RFRA 
only grants objectors a right to be free of any unjustified substantial 
governmental burden on their religious exercise.266 
The court went on to find that even if the accommodation was a 
substantial burden, it furthered a compelling governmental interest by 
promoting public health (reducing unwanted pregnancies and medical risks 
that flow from the same to mother and child) and gender equality (unwanted 
pregnancies bear greater economic burdens on women).267  Finally, the D.C. 
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on the Hobby Lobby dicta previous 
discussed.  Plaintiffs argued that the Government could offer such lesser 
restrictive alternatives as “tax deductions or credits for the purchase of 
contraceptive services, expand eligibility for existing federal programs that 
provide free contraception, allow women to submit receipts to the federal 
government for reimbursement, or provide incentives for pharmaceutical 
262. Id.
263. Id. at 253. 
264. Id. at 249. 
265. Id. at 246 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)).
266. Other circuits agree on the lack of a substantial burden.  Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the 
Aged, Denver v. Burwell. No. 13-1540, 2015 WL 4232096, at *29-30 (10th Cir. 2015); 
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, No.14-2396, 2015 WL 3988356, at *3-5 (7th Cir. 2015); East Texas 
Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, No. 14-20112, 2015 WL 3852811, at *5 (5th Cir. 2015); Geneva Coll. v. 
Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human, Serv., 778 F. 3d 422, 428 n. 3, 442 (3d Cir. 2015), 
stay denied sub nom., Zurik v. Burwell, Nos. 14A1065, 14-1418, 2015 WL 3947586 (2015). 
267. Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 264.  
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companies to provide contraceptives free of charge to women.”268  All of 
these alternatives would substantially impair the government’s interest and 
pose financial, logistical, informational, and administrative burdens on 
women.269  Quoting Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hobby Lobby, the 
court noted that RFRA does not permit religious exercise to “unduly restrict 
other persons, such as employers, in protecting their own interests, interests 
the law deems compelling.”270 
This in turn raises an Establishment Clause issue.  In Estate of Thornton 
v. Caldor,271 the Supreme Court held that a statute that favors one religion
over all other interests violates the Establishment Clause because “[t]he First
Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own
interests others must conform their conduct . . .”272  Accordingly, the Court
struck down a Connecticut statute providing Sabbath observers with an
absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath as a violation of
the Establishment Clause, since the primary effect of the statute was to
impermissibly advance religion.273
Citing Caldor, the Court in 2005 rejected an Ohio prisoners’ RLUIPA 
challenge that prison officials failed to accommodate their exercise of a 
“nonmainstream” religion by  
denying them access to religious literature, denying them the same 
opportunities for group worship that are granted to adherents of mainstream 
religions, forbidding them to adhere to the dress and appearance mandates 
of their religions, withholding religious ceremonial items that are 
substantially identical to those that the adherents of mainstream religions 
are permitted, and failing to provide a chaplain trained in their faith.274   
The Court stated: 
courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested 
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries, and they must be satisfied 
that the Act's prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among 
different faiths.275  
268. Id. at 265. 
269. Id.
270. Id. at 266 (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2786-87 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
271. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
272. Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)). 
273. Id. 
274. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005).
275. Id. at 709. 
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In other words, a permissive accommodation of religion’s exercise must not 
“devolve into an unlawful fostering of religion.”276  As the Establishment 
Clause is a constitutional preexisting external limit on any rights confined by 
statute, it supersedes any application of RFRA that violates it.  Thus, the 
argument that a particular government rule or measure is not the least 
restrictive approach to accommodate a person’s religious liberties is trumped 
if the consequence of that argument violates the Establishment Clause.277 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Repudiating the assertion of Justice Ginsburg, that the accommodation 
granted to Hobby Lobby and Conestoga may impact the rights of thousands 
of their female employees or dependents of their employees,278 the Court 
proclaimed the impact precisely zero.279  These folks, the Court states, have 
access to insurance without cost-sharing for all FDA-approved 
contraceptives, access that furthers an assumed compelling public health 
interest.280  So when Jane Doe, a thirty-five-year-old mother of four, making 
close to minimum wage as a retail clerk at a pro-life and exempt Christian-
based family corporation, gets seen by her family physician for artificial 
contraception needs, there should be precisely zero problems with the no-
cost delivery of that care and any follow-up, such as a prescription or an 
intrauterine device.  No doubt about it, according to the Court.281  Although 
Ms. Doe’s insurance card will show a subscription to a plan which does not 
provide contraceptive services, her employer’s health insurer or a third-party 
administrator will have received all the necessary information from the 
employer to administer her insurance claim.  Or will it have all the 
information?  Can her corporate employer effectively deny Ms. Doe’s care 
by claiming its human shareholders are religiously prohibited from providing 
a notice of exemption?  Surely not.  Surely, the injunction in Wheaton 
College will not obtain permanent status.  Surely, the Court will not back off 
its assurance of meaningful access by equating the exemption-notification 
process with a substantial burden on religious exercise.  We know the three 
                                                                                                                           
276. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 
334–35 (1987). 
277. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemption from the Contraception 
Mandate:  An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 375 
(2014). 
278. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
279. Id. at 2760 (majority opinion). 
280. Id. at 2760, 2780. 
281. See id. at 2760 (“Under [an HHS accommodation for corporate religious objections, female 
employees] would still be entitled to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing.”). 
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female justices are not totally convinced.282  It defies belief the Court would 
backtrack.  The Court did not contest the argument by HHS that the system 
of religious exemption and simultaneous full contraceptive access imposes 
no net burden on the insurance companies that are required to provide the 
coverage.283  Five justices believe the contraceptive mandate serves a 
compelling public health interest.284  The accommodative system in place is 
an “alternative that achieves all of the Government’s aims while providing 
greater respect for religious liberty.”285  Alternate notice to the HHS is now 
on the table, such that HHS can directly rely on this notification “to facilitate 
the provision of full contraceptive coverage under the [ACA].”286  How else 
is full contraceptive coverage effectuated other than by HHS receiving the 
relevant contact information about the insurance payors from the employers, 
the ones who obviously possess this information? 
For-profits now have an exemption.  Can they, with a straight face at a 
cocktail party or before the highest court in the land, contend this right of 
exemption is self-executing, and their simply saying so is the end of the 
matter.  No notification to anyone is required; just leave us alone.  It can be 
said, but it cannot constitutionally be done.  The Court has already endorsed 
employer notice to HHS;287 it has assured all of us “who are bound by [their] 
decisions”288 that full and meaningful access continues in the face of an 
expanded exemption;289 and it has effectively held that the will of the people, 
expressed in the passage of the ACA, will not be impinged.290  The executive 
branch of government has read Hobby Lobby and Wheaton, accepted a role 
as the recipient of the exemption notice, and promulgated proposed 
regulations to coordinate the delivery of no-cost insured care.291  Cries of 
being complicit with, facilitating, initiating or triggering a moral and evil act, 
discussed in the preceding section, cannot carry the day.292  These may very 
well be the sincere beliefs of conscientious objectors, but those beliefs, under 
the law, are not substantially burdened by sending what amounts to a postcard 
to HHS with the name, e-mail address, and phone number of their insurance 
                                                                                                                           
282. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Justices 
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283. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
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contact.  Such a holding would result in the judicial blessing of the following 
principle of law:  
Consistent with the Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI on the Regulation 
of Birth, objections to the contraception mandate of the ACA that are 
compelled by a sincere religious belief, including but not limited to the mere 
notification of opting out of the mandate, are hereby ESTABLISHED as 
immutable and unconditional principles of the United States of America. 
This principle may bear a papal imprimatur, but it violates the first 
clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because the “First 
Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own 
interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious 
necessities.”293  So said Learned Hand in 1953,294 and so said the Court in 
1985, quoting Judge Hand.295  So should the Court re-state and re-affirm this 
principle today. 
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